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FORTHCOMING INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 
 
Why do new EU democracies engage in multilateralism? The dominant explanation 
proposes that new democracies use international treaties to lock in domestic reforms. 
This article offers a novel explanation as to why new EU democracies participate in 
multilateral treaties. We argue that ratifying a treaty serves three external signaling 
purposes (addressing recognition concerns; increasing strategic autonomy, and pleas-
ing the EU). We test our argument through a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
methods. First, we apply event history analysis. Drawing on a new ratification data 
set comprising 76 multilateral treaties, we illustrate the prominent role of new EU 
democracies in multilateralism as compared to other new democracies. Second, to as-
sess the importance of external signaling in the decision to ratify multilateral treaties, 
we examine parliamentary ratification debates in selected Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries. Third, we compare parliamentary discussions across European and 
non-European new democracies to demonstrate the different motives driving their 
approaches toward multilateralism. 
 
Recent empirical studies confirm the conventional wisdom that European states are at the 
forefront of multilateralism in the post-Cold war era. What is particularly noteworthy is the 
high commitment level of new European democracies to multilateral treaties (Elsig, 
Milewicz, and Stürchler 2011). These countries are much more likely to ratify multilateral 
treaties than other new democracies. Yet, the democratization literature is short on theoretical 
explanations to account for the observed variation in ratification patterns. The leading 
s
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
ht
tp
:/
/b
or
is
.u
ni
be
.c
h/
49
45
8/
 
| 
do
wn
lo
ad
ed
: 
13
.3
.2
01
7
The Hidden World of Multilateralism 
 2
explanation refers to new democracies’ use of international law as a “lock-in” instrument 
(Moravcsik 2000). The argument suggests that governments join multilateral institutions in 
order to cement domestic reforms and policies. But no explanation is offered for the variation 
among newly democratized states in terms of their engagement with the multilateral system.  
This article tackles this puzzle and offers a novel explanation for why newly 
democratized states in Europe are among the top ratifiers of post-Cold War multilateral 
treaties. We suggest that these states use treaties not as an internal lock-in signal, but as an 
external signal communicating specific foreign policy objectives. These signals are intended 
to strengthen their international reputation, to increase strategic autonomy, and to please the 
European Union (EU) as the key sponsor of multilateralism. 
The Conventional Argument: New Democracies, Credibility and Lock In 
An important body of literature addresses the role of new democracies in international 
relations and in international law, and shows that newly democratized states are more likely to 
join international organizations and ratify international treaties than are other states. One 
important reason for the active use of international law is related to the governments’ need to 
address concerns of (domestic) credibility. New democracies need to deal with time 
inconsistency (the fact that government’s incentives change over time) and the problem of 
incomplete or asymmetric information (see Barro and Gordon 1983; Canzoneri 1985; Kreps 
and Wilson 1982; Kydland and Prescott 1977; Rodrik 1989). Especially in transitional 
countries with new authorities in office, a short political life expectancy, and a legacy of 
governmental incentives to renege on promises, the public may lack information and therefore 
be generally skeptical about the new government’s motives. In order to mitigate this internal 
credibility problem, the government of a newly established democracy must send a serious 
signal of true intentions. Consequently, newly democratized states rely more than other states 
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on international institutions as a communication device vis-à-vis internal constituencies, in 
order to build up their credibility.  
The dominant version of the communication device has been termed “lock in.” In the 
face of political uncertainty, governments lock in favored policies within intergovernmental 
democratic networks buffering against future governments’ incentives to undo domestic 
reforms (Moravcsik 2000:226, 228; Pinto 1993:43). There exist different versions of the lock-
in argument. One strand emphasizes the goal of “locking in” democratization to minimize the 
risk of democratic reversal. It reflects the governmental efforts to consolidate democracy in 
order to protect it against non-democratic opponents. Another strand explains the participation 
of transitional states in regional institutions such as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a means of bolstering 
security-related or economic reforms at home. Lock in describes an attempt to pre-empt 
domestically induced weakening of reforms that are important for stabilization, economic 
reform or building reputation (Goldstein 1998:143-44; Pevehouse 2002a, 2002b; Mansfield 
and Pevehouse 2006).  
Notwithstanding different objectives, “locking in” is mainly understood as an internal 
signal to political opponents and the domestic public. It has been prominently applied in 
various issue areas. Moravcsik for instance, examining the European Court of Human Rights, 
argues that governments of newly established democracies join the regime as a tactical move 
“to consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability vis-à-
vis non-democratic political threats” (2000:220; see also Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). In 
the case of new EU democracies, the lock-in instrument manifests itself mainly through 
joining regional regimes such as the EU and NATO (Pevehouse 2002b; Schimmelfennig 
2005). The lock-in argument is also well-known in relation to trade agreements. Using stock 
market data from Mexico, Tomz (1997) provides strong evidence that NAFTA made trade 
reforms more credible. He shows that agreements can exert a powerful effect on the 
The Hidden World of Multilateralism 
 4
trustworthiness of reforms. In sum, the existing empirical evidence indicates that the lock-in 
mechanism is particularly important in the context of regional institutions. 
We posit that locking in is less relevant in the context of multilateral agreements. We 
conjecture that if new democracies find themselves confronted with a prominent regional 
institution (like the EU or NATO), this will provide the prime institutional framework for 
their lock-in intentions. By implication, these states will commit to multilateral treaties for 
other reasons. 
Our Argument: Multilateral Treaties and External Signals 
We argue that multilateral treaties are important external signals. We understand them as 
alternative tools of communication to the inward-oriented lock-in mechanism. They serve 
goals other than democratic consolidation or economic reforms, and are not directed at the 
domestic public or domestic opponents, but address a different audience. External signals are 
outward-oriented and are sent by governments to the international community or international 
and regional organizations to communicate their foreign policy objectives in international 
politics. Put differently, states use external and internal signals to pursue different objectives 
and to target different audiences. We distinguish three types of external signals in the context 
of new European democracies. Table 1 summarizes the three signals and lists the action, 
objective and the receiver. 
 
TABLE 1. Treaty Ratification as External Signaling Device 
Sender Action Objective Signal Receiver 
New EU 
democracies  
Treaty 
ratification 
Improve international 
reputation 
RECOGNITION International 
community  
Conduct quasi-autonomous 
foreign policy-making  
STRATEGIC 
AUTONOMY 
Russia & members in 
multilateral fora 
Show willingness to follow 
the multilateral lead of the 
EU 
PLEASING EU Regional 
organization (EU or 
NATO) 
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The first RECOGNITION signal reflects the objective of newly democratized European 
states to achieve acceptance by the international community. Whereas many new democracies 
in other parts of the world were prominently active in bilateral, regional or international 
treaty-making prior to regime transition, new democracies in Europe (under the influence of 
the Soviet Union) were heavily constrained as independent actors in world politics. The 1990s 
provided them with a new opportunity to remedy this deficiency by actively participating in 
treaty-making as well as through ratifying a set of treaties that were previously negotiated by 
other states. Therefore, participation is explained by new EU democracies’ desire for 
international acceptance and recognition. Commitment to international agreements enhances 
recognition and increases the perceived legitimacy of a state (Franck 1990; Hurd 1999). 
Recognition is a constituting factor of state sovereignty. “Recognition is an institution of State 
practice that can resolve uncertainties as to status and allow for new situations to be 
regularized” (Crawford 2007:27). In this sense, foreign policy tools are used to signal new 
sovereignty as a state. There are various tools available, including legal practice (customary 
international law) or credible implementation. For latecomers, the process of establishing 
customs and credible commitment through implementation is, however, too lengthy. 
Therefore, consent to existing international treaties offers a “short cut” to international 
recognition.2 Following this logic, the act of ratifying multilateral treaties is the search for a 
seal of approval by the international community.  
The second STRATEGIC AUTONOMY signal represents attempts by newly democratized 
states to conduct quasi-autonomous foreign policy-making to overcome strategic gaps not 
addressed directly by the RECOGNITION signal. Two objectives stand out. First, ratifying 
security and crime-related multilateral treaties can work as an additional assurance device. It 
is worth recalling that new democracies were faced with significant security threats in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. As accession to NATO, especially, was not a foregone conclusion 
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and could not address all security challenges, new European democracies used multilateral 
treaties to address strategic objectives. The main addressee was clearly Russia as the 
successor state of the former Soviet Union. Concerns were high in particular in the Baltic 
states and many other Central and Eastern European states (Haerpfer, Milosinski, and Wallace 
1999). Second, new EU democracies may ratify multilateral agreements as a means of 
conducting autonomous foreign policy. This is related to the issue of uncertainty about the 
behavior of other actors and about future challenges (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). 
Participating in multilateral treaties (for example, by ratifying framework agreements), will 
enable these states to play a more influential part in future treaty-making (for example, 
protocols).  
The third PLEASING EU signal is used by newly democratized governments as an 
alternative instrument to communicate directly to the EU their willingness to follow the EU 
lead in multilateralism. The number one foreign policy objective in the European context has 
been EU and NATO memberships. By signaling adherence to common EU norms and values 
and support of EU positions, this instrument is destined to generate goodwill for accession 
negotiations. Multilateral commitments have been well received in Brussels and by member 
states, not least, because the EU and many old EU member states have been the chief 
supporters of multilateralism for quite some time. In addition, new democracies have been 
confronted since the early 1990s with a number of criteria to be fulfilled before they could 
join the EU. The Copenhagen Declaration of 1993 referred to “stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” as criteria for membership. 
Therefore, newly democratized European states ratify multilateral treaties to signal to the EU 
that they are reliable multilateral partners and are working toward fulfilling EU conditions for 
entry.  
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While we expect these three signals to have a positive effect on the ratification rates of 
new EU democracies, we also investigate how the relevance of the three signals is 
conditioned by issue area. In some areas, all three signals will be equally at work; in other 
policy fields one signal might outweigh the others. Some of the signals (for example, pleasing 
the EU) will be also less relevant for other new (non-European) democracies’ decisions to 
ratify multilateral treaties. This should lead to observable differences in the rate and pace of 
ratification for new democracies within and outside Europe.  
In testing our argument, we also pay attention to the fact that new democracies might 
join multilateral treaties for other reasons than those outlined above. They might want to reap 
short-term benefits (for example, transfer payments or technical assistance) or to express a 
genuine and sincere commitment toward multilateralism. 
Empirical Analysis 
We test our argument through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, to gauge 
the expected level of treaty participation of new EU democracies (in comparison with other 
groups of states) we apply event history analysis drawing on an original ratification data set. 
Second, we examine arguments raised during parliamentary ratification debates in Central and 
Eastern European countries in order to trace the underlying motivations. Third, to illustrate 
the different motives driving new democracies’ approaches toward multilateralism, we 
contrast parliamentary discussions related to treaty ratifications in Europe with parliamentary 
discussions in Latin America. 
Patterns of Treaty Commitment in the Post-Cold War Era 
In order to demonstrate that new EU democracies are strong supporters of multilateralism, we 
analyze ratification data for 76 post-Cold War multilateral treaties concluded between 1990 
and 2005. An overview of the selected treaties is presented in Table A1 of the appendix. We 
do not carry out a direct test of our external signaling arguments in this section, but provide 
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evidence that the likelihood of treaty ratification varies across newly established democracies 
within and outside Europe. 
For the purpose of this analysis, we use event history techniques. Event history 
modeling offers an appropriate method for analyzing the timing of political change, i.e., the 
change in status from non-ratification to ratification. It not only considers which states ratify 
treaties, but also takes into account that states do so with different time lags. Furthermore, 
event history techniques can be applied to data with “multiple events per subject” (Therneau 
and Grambsch 2000). In this study, each subject under observation can experience multiple 
and parallel events. Since our goal is to demonstrate the overall pattern of multilateral treaty 
commitment – rather than to examine the ratification of individual treaties per se – we need to 
take into account that each state can ratify up to 76 treaties. The state is the “subject” of the 
analysis and is at risk of experiencing the “event” of ratifying a treaty. That is, a particular 
state can ratify several treaties, and it can ratify any number of these treaties in the same year. 
In order to account for this specification, we organized the data as a counting process 
following the approach of Andersen and Gill (1982) (AG). The AG approach is particularly 
suited to analyzing mutual independence of the observations within a subject (Box-
Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002:1073–74; Therneau and Grambsch 2000:185–86). It assumes 
that multiple events for any particular subject are conditionally independent; the risk of 
experiencing the event for a given subject is unaffected by any earlier event that happened to 
the same subject. Put differently, state A can ratify treaty X without or before ratifying treaty 
Y, and state B can ratify treaty Y without or before ratifying treaty X. The counting process 
data consists of multiple records and is set up as annual intervals.3 By clustering on states, we 
are able to account for correlated groups of observations (non-independence of multiple 
ratifications per state) applying robust sandwich variance estimators based on a grouped 
jackknife (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004:158).4 
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We report the results on the basis of modified Kaplan-Meier survivor curves and Cox 
proportional hazards regression models with the modified partial likelihood for left-truncated 
and right-censored data (Tableman and Kim 2004).5  
Main Explanatory Variable 
We operationalize new democracies with two related measures: a categorical variable 
measuring whether a state is a “new democracy” (reference category), AUTOCRACY, 
ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACY or OTHER; and a dichotomous variable NEW DEMOCRACY measuring 
whether a state falls under the category “new democracy” or “not new democracy”. Both 
variables measure the domestic regime type of a state and are based on the polity2 score 
ranging from –10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) from the Polity IV index 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2007). We define new democracies as states which averaged a value of 
less than 1 on the Polity IV scale in the 1970 to 1988 period, and averaged a value of 5 or 
more between 2000 and 2007. Autocracies are defined by an average value of less than 1 for 
both periods. Established democracies averaged values of greater or equal 5 in both periods. 
States which do not fall under any of the three categories are coded as “other.” In addition, we 
created a binary EU variable controlling for whether or not a state was a member of the 
European Union as of 2008.6 
Controls 
In order to grasp the explanatory range of “new democracies,” we control for alternative 
explanations in the Cox proportional hazards regressions.  
First, to capture the extent to which commitment to multilateral institutions is solely 
driven by the degree of state power, we use a MILITARY POWER indicator composed of three 
variables: military expenditure (in thousands of current year US$), military personnel (in 
thousands) and energy consumption (in thousands of US coal-ton equivalents) (Milewicz 
2010, based on Correlates of War Project 2007). Because powerful states are more assertive 
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and influential than weak states in negotiating and designing treaties, they can shape the 
content of treaties to make them congruent with their own interests. Therefore, powerful 
states find that treaty ratification entails obligations with little or no constraining effect 
(Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996). 
Second, we control for the extent to which a state is economically interconnected with 
the global economy using the variable TRADE OPENNESS (total trade as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP)) (Heston, Summers and Aten 2009). Countries that are more 
interdependent with the global economic system generally will be more supportive of 
strengthening multilateral regulatory governance than countries with limited economic ties. 
We also control for the effect of state duration and colonial past. The dichotomous 
variable STATE DURATION indicates whether a state gained independence after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1989.7 The newer the state, the more it will be concerned with its 
sovereignty and therefore the less likely to ratify multilateral agreements. The dichotomous 
variable COLONIAL PAST determines whether a state has been colonized by a Western colonial 
power since 1700. The focus is exclusively on “Western overseas” colonialism (Teorell and 
Hadenius 2005). As past experience with colonialism is linked to a state’s struggle for 
independence, we expect former colonies to be reluctant to bind themselves through 
multilateral treaties.  
Finally, we also test whether the overall effects remain unchanged when we control for 
issue areas. We include binary variables for three major issue areas covered in our sample: 
HUMAN RIGHTS (including human rights, cultural and public health agreements), SECURITY 
(including security, crime and diplomatic relations), and ENVIRONMENT (“trade” is the 
reference category). 
Results 
Our results support the general argument that new EU democracies are strong supporters of 
post-Cold War multilateralism. Figure 1 shows that the ratification pace in the period 1990 to 
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2008 differs significantly for new democracies within and outside the European Union. New 
EU democracies consistently ratified the 76 selected multilateral treaties at a faster rate than 
non-EU democracies. 
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FIG 1. Kaplan-Meier Curve for New Democracies within the EU and outside the EU 
(Note. Not all 76 selected treaties were open for ratification from the start of the study in 1990 only; about 30% 
of the 76 treaties were adopted before 1995, and only 14.5% before 1994 (for dates of adoption see table A1). 
This accounts for the fact that there is no difference in the percentage of ratifications between new democracies 
within and outside the EU until the mid-1990s). 
 
This finding holds across different policy fields (see Figure 2). New EU democracies 
ratify multilateral treaties more rapidly in all four issue areas. Differences in the ratification 
pace are most evident in the areas of crime & security, and human rights. 
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New Democracies: Crime & Security
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FIG 2. Kaplan-Meier Curves for New Democracies by Issue Areas of Multilateral Treaties 
(Note. Not all 76 selected treaties have been open for ratification from the start of the study in 1990. In the case 
of environmental treaties the average date of adoption was 1997). 
 
In order to assess the effect of “new democracies” and “new EU democracies” under 
the ceteris paribus assumption, we use Cox proportional hazards regression models. The Cox 
proportional hazards model estimates hazard ratios for the variables discussed above. The 
hazard ratio8 is the exponential of the regression coefficient (exp(coef)) in the model and 
measures the effect of the variable. A hazard ratio of 1 indicates that there is no effect on state 
commitment to international agreements. A ratio of more than 1 indicates an increase in the 
rate of ratification, and a ratio of less than 1 indicates a reduction in the rate of ratification. 
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Any statement that a state is more likely to commit is also a statement that the state is more 
likely to commit earlier and vice versa. The results from the Cox proportional hazards 
regressions are presented in table 2.  
 
TABLE 2. Results – Cox Proportional Hazards Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 exp(coef) (p) 
exp(coef) 
(p) 
exp(coef) 
(p) 
exp(coef) 
(p) 
exp(coef) 
(p) 
exp(coef) 
(p) 
NEW DEMOCRACY   1.36 
0.00*** 
1.34 
0.00*** 
1.42 
0.00*** 
1.46 
0.00*** 
AUTOCRACY  
(COMP. TO NEW DEMO.) 
0.54 
0.00*** 
0.58 
0.00***    
 
ESTAB. DEMOCRACY  
(COMP. TO NEW DEMO.) 
1.06 
0.42 
0.99 
0.91    
 
OTHER  
(COMP. TO NEW DEMO.) 
0.71 
0.00*** 
0.71 
0.00***    
 
EU  1.58 0.00***  
1.92 
0.00*** 
2.21 
0.00*** 
2.23 
0.00*** 
NEW 
DEMOCRACIES*EU     
0.72 
0.00*** 
0.69 
0.00*** 
STATE DURATION 0.88 
0.2 
0.91 
0.19    
 
TRADE OPENNESS 1.00 
0.74 
1.00 
0.36 
1.00 
0.36 
1.00 
0.14  
1.00 
0.21 
COLONIAL PAST 0.79 
0.002** 
0.96 
0.56 
0.75 
0.00*** 
0.98 
0.84  
0.96 
0.63 
MILITARY POWER 0.44 
0.09 
0.84 
0.7 
0.83 
0.75 
1.78 
0.23  
1.54 
0.39 
HUMAN RIGHTS      1.45 0.00*** 
ENVIRONMENT      1.43 0.00*** 
SECURITY      2.1 0.00*** 
Likelihood ratio test (p) 508.6 (0) 613 (0) 234.1 (0) 460.2 (0) 512.3 (0) 832.3 (0) 
Wald test (p) 118.3 (0) 262.4 (0) 55.3 (0) 177.9 (0) 220.1 (0) 424.7 (0) 
Robust score logrank 
test (p) 
60.79 (0) 63.39 (0) 37.05 (0) 45.24 (0) 45.81 (0) 91.3 (0) 
No. Observations 77051 77051 77051 77051 87605 77051 
No. Events 5013 5013 5013 5013 5482 5013 
No. States 152 152 152 152 159 152 
Period 1991-2007 1991-2007 1991-2007 1991-2007 1991-2008 1991-2007 
(Note. The likelihood ratio test assumes independence of observations within a cluster (country), the Wald and 
robust score tests do not. ***p|z| = <0.001, **p|z| = <0.01, *p|z| = <0.05). 
 
Models 1 and 2 show the effect for new democracies based on the categorical “new 
democracy” variable. Both models reveal that autocracies (model 1: 54%, model 2: 58%) and 
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“other” states (71% in models 1 and 2) have significantly lower ratification likelihoods than 
do new democracies. Differences between new and established democracies, however, are not 
statistically significant. Model 2 reveals that an EU member state is 58% more likely to ratify 
post-Cold War treaties than is a state which is not a member of the EU. Models 3 and 4 are 
estimated in parallel to models 1 and 2, but are based on the dichotomous variable NEW 
DEMOCRACY. Holding other variables constant, we find that new democracies are more likely 
to commit to international agreements than other states (model 3: 36%, model 4: 34%).9 
Model 4 also shows that EU members are 92% more likely to ratify multilateral treaties. In 
models 5 and 6 we incorporate an interaction term for NEW DEMOCRACIES and EU in order to 
test the ratification likelihood of “new EU democracy” against “new non-EU democracy.” 
Model 5 is a reduced model and presents the estimated effect for the main variable (NEW 
DEMOCRACIES*EU). In model 6 we control for the other relevant factors and include the issue 
area variables: SECURITY, ENVIRONMENT and HUMAN RIGHTS. In both models our main 
variable is statistically significant. Following model 5, a new EU democracy is 59% more 
likely to ratify a multilateral post-Cold War treaty than is a new democracy outside the EU; 
and under the ceteris paribus assumption the effect is 54% (models 6).10 The ratification 
likelihood also differs across major issue areas. We find the highest effect for SECURITY on 
treaty ratification (110%). For new EU democracies the likelihood of ratifying security 
treaties is 45% higher than for human rights treaties and 48% higher than for environmental 
treaties.11 As regards the other controls, we find no robust and statistically significant effect 
for MILITARY POWER, TRADE OPENNESS, COLONIAL PAST and STATE DURATION. Overall, the 
statistical results strongly confirm that newly established EU democracies are at the forefront 
of multilateralism.12  
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Evidence from Parliamentary Debates 
Since “legislatures in democracies play a crucial role in signaling state preferences and in 
making international commitments” (Kydd 2009:300), we analyze parliamentary debates over 
treaty ratification in Central and Eastern Europe between 1992 and 2007 to study states’ 
motives for treaty ratification. While in most cases the government is responsible for 
presenting the rationale for ratification to the legislature, the actual decision for or against 
ratification is taken by a parliamentary vote following debates where representatives table 
arguments (based on preferences) in support of or in opposition to ratification. The debates 
reveal how disputed or undisputed ratification is domestically.  
The analysis of the parliamentary debates involves five newly democratized states and 
17 multilateral treaties. Below, we briefly describe the rationale for our selection of countries 
and treaties and provide evidence from parliamentary debates on treaty ratification.  
The selected countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and 
Romania. These countries differ with regard to a number of key characteristics. First, the 
selected countries are in different geographic locations in Europe: Estonia represents the 
group of Baltic States; Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are located in Central 
Europe; Romania is in South-Eastern Europe. Second, the date of EU accession differs. The 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic and Estonia joined the EU in 2004; Romania 
acceded in 2007. Third, the countries differ in size. Poland is the largest in terms of area and 
population (38.1 million) followed by Romania (21.5 million), Czech Republic (10.5 million) 
and Slovakia (5.4 million). Estonia is the smallest country in terms of territory and population 
size (1.3 million). Finally, as far as ethnic composition is concerned, Poland and the Czech 
Republic are relatively homogeneous nation states. In Romania and Slovakia ethnic minorities 
account for about 10% of the population (Hungarians are the largest minority in both 
countries). Estonia is a fairly heterogeneous country, with Russians being the greatest ethnic 
minority (around 25%) (European Union 2012). 
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We chose a subset of 17 particularly significant treaties from our full sample. An 
overview of the selected treaties, including the ratification dates for the five countries is 
presented in table A2. These treaties include some of the most significant international law 
instruments post-1990 (examples are the Kyoto Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention 
and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). We expect parliaments not simply 
to rubberstamp governments’ decisions, but to engage in a proper ratification debate.13 The 
subset of the selected agreements also cuts across different issue areas; it includes six treaties 
on the environment; seven on trade14, three each on security and human rights; two in the area 
of criminal law and two on culture. Finally, the selection of treaties covers the entire period of 
analysis from the early 1990s to 2007. Four of the treaties were concluded before 1996, ten 
between 1996 and 2000, and three after 2000 (see table A2). Of the subset of 17 treaties, the 
Czech Republic did not ratify two treaties, and Estonia and Poland one treaty each. All 17 
treaties have been adopted in Romania and Slovakia. 
Statements during Parliamentary Ratification Debates 
In order to test the exact signals sent by new EU democracies when ratifying multilateral 
agreements (1. RECOGNITION, 2. STRATEGIC AUTONOMY, 3. PLEASING EU), we analyzed the 
content of parliamentary debates. We engaged five coders with the linguistic skills to search 
and translate parliamentary debates over ratification of the selected treaties. The available data 
enabled us to study 58 parliamentary debates.15 
The parliamentary debates strongly support our argument that treaty ratification serves 
specific strategic foreign policy objectives. While we found evidence for outward-oriented 
signaling toward the international community, the EU and Russia, we found no evidence that 
would indicate a government strategy to lock in domestic politics through intergovernmental 
networks.16 
Overall we recorded 62 statements from 42 debates.17 Most of the statements 
confirming our expectations were made in debates held in the Polish parliament (16 
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statements; 26% of all statements), followed by Estonia (14 statements; 23%) and Romania 
(13 statements; 21%). In the ratification debates of the Slovak National Council 10 such 
statements were made (amounting to 16% of all statements). For the Czech Republic, where 
fewer debates were available, we counted 9 statements (15%) (see tables 3 and A3). 
More than half of all statements (52%) indicate willingness to follow the European 
lead in multilateralism.18 Statements in support of European norms and values were made 
most frequently in the Romanian debates (accounting for 28% of all statements referring to 
the PLEASING EU signal). The objective of achieving international acceptance and recognition 
by the international community was signaled in 18 statements (29% of all statements). 
International recognition was the most prominent concern in the Polish parliamentary debates 
(33% of the statements related to the RECOGNITION signal).19 Twelve statements refer to the 
attempts to pursue strategic autonomy (amounting to 19% of all statements). Most such 
statements were made in the Estonian debates (6 in total coming to 50% of all STRATEGIC 
AUTONOMY statements).20 
To account for the possibility that commitment to multilateral treaties might simply 
represent opportunistic behavior, we searched the parliamentary ratification debates for 
statements other than external signaling. We found eight statements in the debates in Estonia, 
Poland and Romania that did not fall under one of the three major signaling arguments but 
which refer to other signals such as eligibility for financial assistance (see table A3). As such 
references were sporadic, we can rule out the possibility that commitment to multilateral 
treaties is predominantly driven by opportunistic considerations. Conversely, we found no 
evidence that new European democracies joined multilateral treaties for truly sincere reasons 
(believing in the virtue of multilateralism as the right form of international cooperation). 
 
TABLE 3. Contingency Table with Absolute and Relative Statement Frequencies by Country and Signal 
Signal 
 
RECOGNITION STRATEGIC 
AUTONOMY 
PLEASING EU Total 
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Country 
Czech Republic 3 (17%) 1 (8%) 5 (16%) 9 (15%) 
Estonia 2 (11%) 6 (50%) 6 (19%) 14 (23%) 
Poland 6 (33%) 3 (25%) 7 (22%) 16 (26%) 
Romania 3 (17%) 1 (8%) 9 (28%) 13 (21%) 
Slovakia 4 (22%) 1 (8%) 5 (16%) 10 (16%) 
Total 18 (29%) 12 (19%) 32 (52%) 62 (100%) 
 
The number of statements also varies across the issue areas addressed in multilateral 
treaties. Most statements were made in relation to security treaties (19 in number, amounting 
to 31% of all statements): eight statements referred to the aspect of gaining international 
RECOGNITION; seven referred to PLEASING EU; and four addressed the need for STRATEGIC 
AUTONOMY. Overall, seventeen statements (27%) were made in the context of environmental 
treaties of which a majority addressed the aspect of EU membership (41%). Thirteen 
statements concerned ratification of treaties with criminal law provisions (21%), five 
statements have been recorded in relation to human rights agreements (8%), and four 
statements with respect to trade and cultural provisions (6% each) (see table 4). 
In conclusion, parliamentary ratification debates provide strong evidence of the 
relative importance of the three signals outlined in the theoretical section. 
 
TABLE 4. Contingency Table with Absolute and Relative Statement Frequencies by Issue Area and Signal 
Signal 
 
Issue area 
RECOGNITION STRATEGIC 
AUTONOMY 
PLEASING EU Total 
Environment 3 (17%) 1 (8%) 13 (41%) 17 (27%) 
Security 8 (44%) 4 (33%) 7 (22%) 19 (31%) 
Crime 4 (22%) 4 (33%) 5 (16%) 13 (21%) 
Human Rights 2 (11%) 0 (0%) 3 (9%) 5 (8%) 
Culture 0 (0%) 2 (17%) 2 (6%) 4 (6%) 
Trade 1 (6%) 1 (8%) 2 (6%) 4 (6%) 
Total  18 (29%) 12 (19%) 32 (52%) 62 (100%) 
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European and Other New Democracies Compared 
In this section we contrast parliamentary debates on the ratifications of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
(Cartagena Protocol) in new European democracies with parliamentary debates in two new 
democracies in Latin America (Chile and Uruguay).21 This comparison illustrates different 
rationales for ratifying multilateral treaties in new democracies within and outside Europe. 
The choice of two contentious treaties should also make potential lock-in strategies more 
visible, should they be present.22  
In the case of European states, the evidence for these two treaties emphasizes the 
importance of the EU signal, although arguments related to recognition and autonomous 
policy-making were also found. For the Latin American countries, none of these external 
signals seems relevant for the decision to ratify.23 Both agreements arouse significant 
domestic political opposition in Chile and Uruguay. The process of parliamentary ratification 
was tedious and dragged on for a long time in both countries (Chile has not yet ratified the 
Cartagena Protocol). The Rome Statute, which could potentially serve as a lock-in device for 
domestic criminal law provisions, judicial practice or even constitutional reforms was 
opposed by important segments of society. This made it difficult for the governing parties to 
proceed toward ratification. In addition, both countries took some political risks in pursuing 
ratification since the US did not ratify either of the two agreements.  
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  
The Rome Statute was adopted in 1998 and established the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) with the objective of prosecuting individuals for specific crimes (for example, genocide 
and crimes against humanity). The Court complements national judicial systems: it can only 
exercise jurisdiction where national courts are unable or unwilling to do so. So far 118 states 
have ratified the Statute. 
The Hidden World of Multilateralism 
 20
Ratification debates in new democracies in Europe were characterized by a low degree 
of contestation. Only a handful of critical voices were raised. Poland ratified the Statute in 
2001. Members of Parliament (MPs) recalled the great importance the EU attached to the 
Statute. Special reference was made to a resolution of the European Parliament which stated 
that ratification of the Statute is necessary for EU accession. One MP mentioned that being 
among the first 60 ratifying states would improve institutional access to and representation in 
the Court. Only one MP questioned whether ratifying the Statute would limit Polish 
sovereignty and be inconsistent with the national constitution (Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
2001). 
In Romania the debate took place in 2002. The State Secretary of the Ministry of 
Justice noted that ratification supports “Romania’s decision to integrate into the structures of 
European Union and to assume its responsibilities within the international community. In 
addition, it will ensure Romania’s participation to the first general meeting of the signatory 
states” (Parlamentul României 2002). This statement also reflected the views of other MPs 
and suggests that ratification of this treaty was associated with concerns about autonomous 
decision-making in foreign policy (Parlamentul României 2002). The Statute was finally 
ratified by the Senate in the same year with 88 votes in favor, 3 against, and 3 abstentions. 
Ratification in Latin American countries was more complicated. In particular, the case 
of Chile stands out. Chile was the last Latin American country to ratify the Statute. Having 
signed the Rome Statute, the Chilean President asked the Parliament to consider an 
implementation act to meet the obligations under the Statute. On 22 January 2002 the 
Chamber of Deputies passed the implementation bill with 67 of 116 votes (Camara de 
Diputados 2002). During the parliamentary debate, critical voices were raised regarding 
constitutional conformity, national sovereignty and US opposition to the Statute. 
Nevertheless, the debate was dominated by concerns that international law could constrain 
national courts’ interpretations of existing amnesty laws that protected members of the 
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Pinochet regime. Following the vote, 35 conservative MPs took the issue to the constitutional 
court which ruled that a constitutional amendment would be necessary (Guzmán Dalbora 
2006:173–4). As a result, the government was forced to engage in a long and burdensome 
constitutional reform process. It was not until 17 June 2009 that the Chilean Chamber of 
Deputies passed the ratification act with 79 votes in favor, 9 in opposition and 1 abstention. 
The ratification process in Uruguay was also quite politicized and characterized by 
disagreement over the implementation act. Similar to the Chilean case, many MPs argued that 
the Rome Statute would challenge the Uruguayan constitution (Camara de Senadores 2002). 
The government, anticipating opposition from former members of the military regime, 
refrained from proposing an amendment of the constitution. Instead, it proposed an 
interpretative declaration to clarify the relationship between obligations flowing from the 
international treaty and the existing Constitution. This declaration elevated the Constitution 
above the Statute and was criticized by many states, in particular European states, as a de 
facto reservation which was not permissible under the Rome Statute. Ultimately, the 
Uruguayan parliament accepted the implementation act and ratified the Rome Statute on 27 
June 2002 (Galain Palermo 2006:403). Yet, the implementation act has dragged on for many 
years. Similar to the Chilean case, it took a long time for the domestic courts (and 
constitutional amendments) to prepare the ground to hold former dictator Juan Maria 
Bordaberry accountable for violations of human rights. In sum, in both Latin American 
countries it proved difficult for the governments to bring the internal lock-in signal into play; 
external signaling on the other had was absent. 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
The Cartagena Protocol supplements the Convention on Biological Diversity and regulates 
the safe handling, transport and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from 
modern biotechnology (Biosafety Clearing-House 2012). The Protocol obliges state parties to 
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inform other governments about the intentional transboundary movement of LMOs and to 
wait for acceptance prior to transport. The Protocol was adopted on 29 January 2000 and 
counts to date 161 parties. 
The ratification of the Cartagena Protocol generated only little political debate in the 
parliaments of the new European democracies. Given that the EU was a strong supporter of 
the main objectives of the Protocol and the regulation of LMOs in Europe has to be applied in 
EU candidate countries, the ratification of the Protocol was not contested. In the Czech 
Republic, the Minister of Environment presented a proposal for the ratification of the 
Cartagena Protocol (in the first reading) to the Chamber of Deputies in late 2000. He 
proposed two major reasons for accepting the Protocol: First, ratification would strengthen the 
international prestige of the Czech Republic, and second, it would be an important step in the 
preparations for EU accession. Similar statements were made during the second reading 
(Poslanecká Sněmovna Parlamentu České Republiky 2000, 2001). The Protocol was adopted 
by 78 votes with 27 abstentions. 
During the ratification debate in the Estonian parliament in 2003, the Minister of 
Environment stressed that ratification of the Protocol was necessary for both political and 
economic reasons. In particular, he highlighted that the EU had already ratified the Protocol 
and that “Estonia has to assure the protection of the environment, human health and fulfill the 
obligations coming from joining the EU.” In addition, he argued that “if Estonia ratifies the 
protocol, it will open doors for certain UN financing opportunities” (Riigikogu 2003). With 
the exception of this reference to monetary incentives, a closer look at the debates in Eastern 
European countries confirms that the decision to ratify was largely grounded on reputational 
concerns and the desire to please the EU. 
Ratification processes in Latin America took much longer; this is partially due to the 
negotiation history of the Protocol. Uruguay and Chile participated actively in negotiations 
through the US-led Miami Group. As important LMOs exporting countries they attempted to 
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limit the Protocol’s impact on free trade in LMOs, fearing the misuse of legal instruments (for 
example, on the basis of the precautionary principle) for protectionist purposes (Bail, Falkner 
and Marquard 2002). While they were not satisfied with the outcome, they achieved some 
concessions in the negotiations. Chile and Uruguay signed the agreement in 2000 and 2001, 
respectively. Chile started the ratification process soon after, but did not ratify the Protocol to 
date. Uruguay initiated the ratification process at the end of 2008 and only ratified in 
November 2011. In an earlier report to its parliament, the Uruguayan Government noted that 
147 parties (including Brazil and Paraguay) had already ratified the Protocol. Lagging behind 
with its ratification, Uruguay had been unable to participate in four conferences of the parties 
regarding the future development of the Protocol. This undermined its strategic position and 
decreased its influence over the subsequent design of the Protocol (Comisión de Asuntos 
Internacionales 2010). 
The lengthy ratification process of the Cartagena Protocol can mainly be attributed to 
perceived costs of the agreement, which have been already a point of disapproval during 
negotiations. Moreover, due to the nature of the treaty there were no lock-in attempts. 
Conclusions 
European states have been at the forefront of multilateralism since the end of the Cold War. 
However, the fact that new EU democracies have been especially interested in multilateral 
treaties has so far been overlooked in the literature. We have provided a theoretical 
explanation for new European democracies’ strong propensity to ratify multilateral 
agreements.  
New European democracies ratify multilateral treaties as a signal to help them achieve 
three major foreign policy objectives: to obtain international recognition, to please the EU and 
to foster their strategic autonomy for future foreign policy making. The evidence from 
parliamentary ratification debates in five new European democracies shows that the “EU 
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signal” has been the dominant consideration in these debates, whereas substantive statements 
not involving these three objectives have been very rare. What is more, new European 
democracies have set aside sovereignty concerns in their post-Cold War rush to ratification. 
Although domestic opponents often regard multilateral engagement as reducing sovereignty, 
external signals helped to override such considerations. 
By comparison, new democracies in other regions face different incentives for joining 
multilateral treaties. Ratification debates in Latin American countries reveal that sovereignty 
costs have been more relevant for the decision (not) to ratify multilateral treaties. In the 
absence of a strong regional institution that could facilitate domestic lock in, the signaling 
value of multilateral treaties is greatly diminished. This is reflected in the slower ratification 
pace and overall fewer commitments.  
What are the wider theoretical implications of our findings? We have offered a more 
nuanced reading of the lock-in argument in relation to new democracies. Our analysis shows 
that new European democracies use multilateral commitments for external signaling, but not 
necessarily for locking in major domestic reforms. This hints toward a division of labor 
between multilateral and regional institutions in the process of democratic consolidation. If 
new democracies have a credible regional organization available, they will use it for major 
domestic institutional renovations, and use multilateral treaties for external signaling. Future 
research should investigate the distinct roles of regional and multilateral institutions in 
democratization and also explore how to enhance their complementarity.  
What are the policy implications for the future orientation of new(er) EU democracies 
vis-à-vis multilateralism? While the EU signal has lost traction for states that have already 
joined the EU, states preparing for EU accession will continue participating in international 
agreements in which the EU shows substantial interest. In this respect, it is not surprising that 
Croatia supports the Kyoto 2 framework for a new Climate agreement which is strongly 
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advocated by the EU. In addition, gaining international recognition and strategic autonomy 
will remain important reasons for states to ratify multilateral treaties swiftly.  
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Appendix 1: Additional Tables. 
TABLE A1. Selected Multilateral Treaties 
 Treaty adopted restricted 
mean 
sd min max N % 
1 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 2000 2004 1.799 2000 2008 150 77.72 
2 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 1996 2001 3.081 1996 2008 146 75.65 
3 Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 1995 2.653 1992 2008 188 97.41 
4 Convention on Nuclear Safety 1994 1998 3.767 1994 2008 62 32.12 
5 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of  
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 
1992 1998 3.616 1993 2008 180 93.26 
6 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of  
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction 
1997 2000 2.388 1997 2007 153 79.27 
7 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel 1994 2001 3.297 1995 2008 87 45.08 
8 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Agreement to Promote Compliance with  
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 
1993 2000 4.199 1994 2008 34 17.62 
9 FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 2001 2004 1.529 2002 2008 116 60.1 
10 Hague Private International Law (PIL) Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 2007 0 2007 2007 1 0.52 
11 Hague PIL Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and  
Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children 
1996 2006 2.646 2003 2008 3 1.55 
12 Hague PIL Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of  
Intercountry Adoption 
1993 2000 3.859 1994 2008 76 39.38 
13 Hague PIL Convention on the International Protection of Adults 2000 2003 2.939 1997 2008 15 7.77 
14 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent  
Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
1997 2002 2.995 1998 2008 45 23.32 
15 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives  
for the Purpose of Detection 
1991 2001 3.99 1992 2008 138 71.5 
16 International Cocoa Agreement 2001 2003 1.088 2001 2005 16 8.29 
17 International Coffee Agreement 2000 2003 1.74 2001 2008 69 35.75 
18 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005 2007 0.78 2006 2008 47 24.35 
19 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997 2003 2.095 1998 2008 160 82.9 
20 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 2003 1.744 2000 2008 166 86.01 
21 International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages 1993 2001 3.848 1995 2007 12 6.22 
22 International Convention on the Arrest of Ships 1999 2002 1.604 2001 2005 7 3.63 
23 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members  
of Their Families (ICRMW) 
1990 2002 4.318 1993 2008 39 20.21 
24 ILO Home Work Convention 1996 2001 3.13 1998 2006 5 2.59 
(Note. restricted mean: average year of ratifications; sd: standard deviation for ratification in years; min: earliest year of ratification; max: latest year of ratification; N: number of 
ratifications; %: percentage of ratifications. Restricted mean and sd refer to the ratifications made; restricted mean is rounded to the actual calendar year (for example, 2005.7 is 
written as 2005)). 
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TABLE A1 (continued). Selected Multilateral Treaties 
 Treaty adopted restricted 
mean 
sd min max N % 
25 ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 1999 2002 1.966 1999 2008 168 87.05 
26 International Maritime Organization (IMO) Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage  
in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea 
1996 2004 2.84 2000 2008 13 6.74 
27 IMO International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990 2000 4.668 1992 2008 97 50.26 
28 IMO International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments 2004 2007 1.32 2005 2008 17 8.81 
29 IMO International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships 2001 2006 1.974 2002 2008 34 17.62 
30 IMO Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous  
and Noxious Substances 
2000 2005 2.117 2002 2008 23 11.92 
31 IMO Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 2001 2006 1.722 2003 2008 32 16.58 
32 International Tropical Timber Agreement 1994 1997 2.578 1994 2006 60 31.09 
33 International Sugar Agreement 1992 1998 5.364 1992 2008 58 30.05 
34 Kyoto Protocol 1997 2003 2.424 1998 2008 180 93.26 
35 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of  
children in armed conflict 
2000 2004 1.965 2000 2008 125 64.77 
36 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children,  
child prostitution and child pornography 
2000 2004 2.013 2000 2008 129 66.84 
37 Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components  
and Ammunition, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
2001 2005 1.673 2002 2008 77 39.9 
38 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the UN Convention  
against Transnational Organized Crime 
2000 2004 1.751 2001 2008 114 59.07 
39 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Protocol IV of the 1980 (to the Convention on Certain  
Conventional Weapons) 
1995 2000 3.034 1996 2008 88 45.6 
40 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons) 2003 2006 1.32 2004 2008 49 25.39 
41 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices  
(to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons) 
1996 2001 3.064 1997 2008 91 47.15 
42 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,  
supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
2000 2004 1.751 2001 2008 123 63.73 
43 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 2002 1.86 1999 2008 107 55.44 
44 Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure for Certain Hazardous  
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 
1998 2004 2.175 1999 2008 124 64.25 
45 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property  
in the Event of Armed Conflict 
1999 2004 2.293 2000 2008 51 26.42 
46 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) 2001 2004 1.714 2001 2008 155 80.31 
47 UN Convention against Corruption 2003 2006 1.245 2003 2008 121 62.69 
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TABLE A1 (continued). Selected Multilateral Treaties 
 Treaty adopted restricted 
mean 
sd min max N % 
48 UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea  
of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and  
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
1995 2002 3.926 1996 2008 71 36.79 
49 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 2004 1.74 2001 2008 143 74.09 
50 UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit 1995 2000 3.162 1997 2005 8 4.15 
51 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 2004 2007 0.983 2006 2008 6 3.11 
52 UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade 2001 2005  2005 2005 1 0.52 
53 UN Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade 1991 2001 4.243 1996 2005 4 2.07 
54 UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1997 2001 3.167 1998 2007 16 8.29 
55 UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts 2005 No ratifications, yet. 
56 UN Convention to Combat Desertification 1994 1998 2.185 1995 2007 190 98.45 
57 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 1995 2.511 1992 2007 189 97.93 
58 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention for the  
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 
2003 2006 1.155 2004 2008 105 54.4 
59 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005 2007 0.754 2005 2008 91 47.15 
60 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001 2006 1.538 2003 2008 20 10.36 
61 UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport 2005 2007 0.908 2005 2008 103 53.37 
62 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Convention on Stolen or  
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 
1995 2001 3.06 1997 2007 29 15.03 
63 UNIDROIT Convention and Protocol on International Interests in Mobile Equipment 2001 2006 1.645 2003 2008 25 12.95 
64 World Customs Organization (WCO) Revised Kyoto Convention 1999 2004 2.286 1999 2008 57 29.53 
65 World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 2003 2005 1.147 2003 2008 157 81.35 
66 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty 1996 2002 2.936 1997 2008 68 35.23 
67 WIPO Trademark Law Treaty 1994 2000 4.06 1995 2008 46 23.83 
68 WIPO Patent Law Treaty 2000 2005 2.293 2001 2008 19 9.84 
69 WIPO Performances & Phonograms Treaty 1996 2003 2.993 1998 2008 68 35.23 
70 WTO Umbrella Agreement 1994 1996 2.787 1995 2008 150 77.72 
71 WTO General Agreement on Trade in Goods 1994 1996 2.787 1995 2008 150 77.72 
72 WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services 1994 1996 2.787 1995 2008 150 77.72 
73 WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  1994 1996 2.787 1995 2008 150 77.72 
74 WTO Dispute Settlement 1994 1996 2.787 1995 2008 150 77.72 
75 WTO Trade Policy Review 1994 1996 2.787 1995 2008 150 77.72 
76 WTO Government Procurement 1994 1999 4.024 1996 2007 37 19.17 
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TABLE A2. Selected Treaties and Ratification Dates 
Treaty Concluded Abbreviation Czech Republic Estonia Poland Romania Slovakia 
Environment   
Convention on Biological Diversity  1992 CBD 1993 1994 1996 1994 1994 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change  1992 FCCC 1993 1994 1994 1994 1994 
Kyoto Protocol 1997 KP 2001 2002 2002 2001 2002 
Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade  1998 RC 2000 2006 2005 2003 2007 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  2000 CPB 2001 2004 2003 2003 2003 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants  2001 SC 2002 2009 2009 2004 2002 
Security   
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction  1992 CWC 1996 1999 1995 1995 1995 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty  1996 NTBT 1997 1999 1999 1999 1998 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction  1997 CAM 1999 2004 --- 2000 1999 
Crime   
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 RSICC 2009 2002 2001 2002 2002 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea 2000 PSM --- 2004 2003 2002 2004 
Human Rights   
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention  1999 C182 2001 2001 2002 2000 1999 
Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 2000 OPAC 2001 --- 2005 2001 2006 
Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography 2000 OPCP --- 2004 2005 2001 2004 
Culture   
UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage 2003 CICH 2009 2006 2011 2006 2006 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions 2005 CDCE 2010 2006 2007 2006 2006 
Trade   
WTO Agreements  1994 WTO 1995 1999 1995 1995 1995 
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TABLE A3. Statements in Parliamentary Debates on Treaty Ratification 
 Czech Republic Estonia Poland Romania Slovakia 
Environment 
CBD NA  2/OA 2  
FCCC NA OA NA NA  
KP NA 2 1/2 2/OA  
RC 2 3 NA OA 2 
CPB 1/2 2/OA NA 2  1/2 
SC 2 NA 2/OA NA 2 
Security 
CWC  3 1/3/OA 1/2 NA 
NTBT 1/3 1/2 1/OA 1 1 
CAM 2 2/3 NR 2 1/2 
Crime 
RSICC NA 1/2/3 1/2/3 1/2/3 2 
PSM NR NA  1/2/3 NA  
Human Rights 
C182 1/2  NA NA  
OPAC  NR 1 NA  
OPCP NR NA  2 2  
Culture 
CICH NA 3 NA 2 3 
CDCE NA  NA 2  
Trade 
WTO NA 2/3 2 NA 1 
NRs 2 1 1 0 0 
NAs 7 3 6 6 1 
No. of debates  8 13 10 11 16 
(Note. 1, RECOGNITION; 2, PLEASING EU; 3, STRATEGIC AUTONOMY; NR, not ratified; NA, information on debate 
not available; OA, Other arguments raised in parliamentary debate; blank, information available, but no 
arguments found. For definitions of treaty abbreviations see Table A2). 
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2 We see recognition analytically prior to reputation; the latter develops over time and is 
related to implementation of international treaties (Guzman 2008). Reputation is “contingent 
on its past behaviour” and “the knowledge that today’s conduct will affect tomorrow’s repu-
tation” (Guzman 2008:86). Therefore, at first, this factor could be called recognition and lat-
er, in the 1990s, reputation. For simplicity we call it recognition. 
3 The data for a subject is presented as multiple rows or “observations,” each of which ap-
plies to an interval of observation (start, stop]. 
4 For a detailed description of the data structure and statistical techniques see Milewicz 
(2010). 
5 In this study, we are confronted with fixed right-censoring and left-truncation. Fixed 
right-censoring applies to all states which had not yet ratified a particular treaty at termination 
of the analysis in December 2008. Left-truncation is determined by a delayed entry time. De-
layed entry times apply to successor states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union, as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
6 This excludes states that are still in the process of accession (and who eventually will be-
come members). 
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7 The original calculation is based on Central Intelligence Agency (2008); cross-checked 
with the Correlates of War Project (2008). 
8 The hazard ratio must be independent of time. This defines the proportional hazards 
property. Results from the test for constancy of the coefficients based on scaled Schoenfeld 
residuals indicate that the assumption of the proportional hazards is met by all covariates.  
9 The hazard ratio for NEW DEMOCRACY is calculated by exp(coefNEW DEMOCRACY) = 1.36 = 
36%. 
10 The hazard ratio for a new EU democracy compared with a new non-EU democracy is 
calculated by exp(coefEU + coefEU*NEW DEMOCRACY). 
11 The hazard ratio is calculated by exp(coefSECURITY)/exp(coefHUMAN RIGHTS). 
12 As the ratification likelihood for new democracies might differ between three time peri-
ods: i) the period between the end of communism and the beginning of accession negotia-
tions; ii) the period of accession negotiations; and iii) the full-membership period – we have 
also tested the results based on a subsample of treaties open for ratification during the period 
of accession negotiations. The results did not change the general pattern. 
13 This choice allows us to gather sufficient information on parliamentary debates upon 
treaty ratification.  
14 As the WTO agreements have been debated and ratified as one agreement, we count the 
WTO agreements as one treaty. 
15 For the Czech Republic we recorded eight debates (two treaties were not debated and 
not ratified; seven debates were not available). Ten parliamentary debates were accessible for 
Poland (six debates were not available; one treaty has not been debated and ratified to date), 
eleven debates for Romania (six debates were not available) and thirteen debates for Estonia 
(three debates were not available; one treaty has not been debated and ratified). Debates on 
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the ratification of sixteen treaties were available in the case of Slovakia (only one debate was 
not available).  
16 In addition, we cross-checked these findings with media reports where available. 
17 We do not distinguish between statements made in the first and second chamber in case 
of bicameral parliamentary systems. We counted statements made by one or more parliamen-
tarians referring to the same signal in a treaty debate as a single statement. 
18 We also examined whether other statements than those supporting the three signals were 
made during the debates; these are reported in Table A3 of the appendix. We found hardly 
any statements other than those reported here. “Negative statements”, such as statements that 
criticized the EU, occurred as well. 
19 This is attributable to Poland’s history and the three partitions of the state. With the third 
partition (1795–1918) Poland lost its independence and recognition as a nation state (Davies 
2001). 
20 Given the Estonian experience of military occupation and annexation by the USSR 
(Lane 1997; Thompson 1998), the frequency of such references in the Estonian parliament is 
not surprising. 
21 Parliamentary ratification debates in Europe on the other selected treaties have devel-
oped similarly. Due to lack of space, we do not report all our findings. 
22 Chile and Uruguay have been chosen among Latin American countries due to availabil-
ity of parliamentary records. 
23 We did not expect to find the “pleasing EU” signal to play a role in these two non-
European countries. 
